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Abstract
Even though many programmers rely on 3-way merge tools
to integrate changes from different branches, such tools can
introduce subtle bugs in the integration process. This pa-
per aims to mitigate this problem by defining a semantic
notion of conflict-freedom, which ensures that the merged
program does not introduce new unwanted behaviors. We
also show how to verify this property using a novel, com-
positional algorithm that combines lightweight dependence
analysis for shared program fragments and precise relational
reasoning for the modifications. We evaluate our tool called
SafeMerge on 52 real-world merge scenarios obtained from
Github and compare the results against a textual merge tool.
The experimental results demonstrate the benefits of our
approach over syntactic conflict-freedom and indicate that
SafeMerge is both precise and practical.
1 Introduction
Developers who edit different branches of a source code
repository rely on 3-way merge tools (like git-merge or
kdiff3) to automaticallymerge their changes. Since the vast
majority of these tools are oblivious to program semantics
and resolve conflicts using syntactic criteria, they may intro-
duce bugs in the merge process. For example, many people
speculate that Apple’s infamous goto fail SSL bug was
introduced due to an erroneous program merge [15, 28, 38].
To see how bugs may be introduced in the merge process,
consider the simple base program shown in Figure 1 together
with its two variants A and B.1 Here, both A and B modify
the original program by incrementing variable x by 1. For
instance, such a situation may arise in practice when two
independent developers simultaneously fix the same bug
in different locations of the original program. Since both
variants effectively make the same change, the correct merge
should be eitherA orB. However, running a 3-waymerge tool
(in this case, kdiff3) on these programs succeeds without
any warnings and generates the incorrect merge shown on
the right hand side of Figure 1. Since this program is clearly
1The example is inspired by the Apple SSL bug that resulted from duplicate
goto statements.
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int f(int x) {
  return x;
}
int f(int x) {
  x++;
  return x;
}
int f(int x) {
  x++;
  return x;
}
Base: Variant A: Variant B:
int f(int x) {
  x++;
  x++;
  return x;
}
Incorrect merge:
Figure 1. Simple motivating example
different than what either developer intended, we see that a
bug was introduced during the merge.
This paper takes a step towards eliminating bugs that arise
due to 3-way program merges by automatically verifying
semantic conflict-freedom, a notion inspired by earlier work
on program integration [25, 43]. To motivate what we mean
by semantic conflict-freedom, consider a base program P , two
variantsA,B, and a merge candidateM . Intuitively, semantic
conflict freedom requires that, if variantA (resp. B) disagrees
with P on the value of some program variable v , then the
merge candidateM should agree withA (resp. B) on the value
of v . In addition to ensuring that the merge candidate does
not introduce new behavior that is not present in either of the
variants, conflict freedom also ensures that variants A and
B do not make changes that are semantically incompatible
with each other.
The main contribution of this paper is a novel composi-
tional verification algorithm, and its implementation in a
tool called SafeMerge, for automatically proving semantic
conflict-freedom. Our method is compositional in that it an-
alyzes different modifications to the program in isolation
and composes them to obtain an overall proof of semantic
conflict-freedom. A key idea that allows compositionality is
to model different versions of the program using edits applied
to a shared program with holes. Specifically, the shared pro-
gram captures common statements between the program ver-
sions, and holes represent discrepancies between them. The
edits describe how to fill each hole in the shared program to
obtain the corresponding statement in a variant. Given such
a representation that is automatically generated by Safe-
Merge, our verification algorithm uses lightweight analysis
to reason about shared program fragments but resorts to
precise relational techniques to reason about modifications.
The overall workflow of our approach is illustrated schemat-
ically in Figure 2. Our method takes as input four related
programs, namely the original program P , two variants A
and B, and a merge candidateM , and represents them as edits
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Figure 2. High-level overview of our approach
applied to a shared program by running a “4-way diff" algo-
rithm on the abstract syntax trees. The verifier leverages the
result of the 4-way diff algorithm to identify which parts of
the program to analyze more precisely. Specifically, our ver-
ification algorithm summarizes shared program fragments
using uninterpreted functions of the form x = f (x1, . . . ,xn)
that encode dependencies between program variables. In con-
trast, the verifier reasons about edited program fragments in
a more fine-grained way by constructing 4-way product pro-
grams that encode the simultaneous behavior of all four ed-
its. Overall, this interplay between lightweight dependence
analysis and product construction allows our technique to
generate verification conditions whose complexity depends
on the size and number of the edits.
To evaluate our technique, we collect over 50 real-world
merge scenarios obtained by crawling Github commit histo-
ries and evaluate SafeMerge on these benchmarks. Our tool
is able to verify the correctness of the merge candidate in
75% of the benchmarks and identifies eleven real violations
of semantic conflict-freedom, some of which are not detected
by textual merge tools. Our evaluation also demonstrates
the scalability of our method and illustrates the advantages
of performing compositional reasoning.
In all, this paper makes the following key contributions:
• We introduce the merge verification problem based on the
notion of semantic conflict-freedom.
• We provide a compositional verification algorithm that
combines precise relational reasoning about the edits with
lightweight reasoning for unedited program fragments.
• We present a novel n-way product construction technique
for precise relational verification.
• We describe an n-way AST diff algorithm and use it to
represent program versions as edits applied to a shared
program with holes.
• We implement our method in a tool called SafeMerge
and evaluate our approach on real-world merge scenarios
collected from Github repositories.
2 Overview
In this section, we give an overview of our approach with the
aid of a merge example from the RxJava project 2. Figure 3
shows the Base version (O) of the triggerActions method
from the TestScheduler.java file. The two variants A, B
and the mergeM perform the following modifications:
2https://github.com/ReactiveX/RxJava/commit/1c47b0c.
1 int time; int value;
2 void triggerActions(long targetTimeInNanos) {
3 while(!queue.isEmpty()){
4 TimedAction current = queue.peek();
5 if(current.time > targetTimeInNanos){
6 time = targetTimeInNanos;
7 break;
8 }
9 time = current.time;
10 queue.remove();
11 current.action.call(current.scheduler , current.state);
12 } }
Figure 3. Procedure from the base program in RxJava.
• VariantAmoves the statement time = targetTimeInNanos
at line 6 to immediately after the while loop. This modi-
fication impacts the value of the variable time in A with
respect to the Base version.
• Variant B guards the call current.action.call(...) at
line 11with a condition if(!current.isCancelled.get())
{...}. The call (at line 11) has a side effect on the variable
called value (we omit the implementation of this proce-
dure). This modification changes the effect on value with
respect to the Base version.
• The mergeM incorporates both of these changes.
This example is interesting in that both variants modify
code within a loop, and one of them (namely, B) changes
the control-flow by introducing a conditional. The loop in
turn depends on the state of an unbounded collection queue,
which is manipulated using methods such as queue.isEmpty
and queue.remove. Furthermore, while triggerActions has
no return value, it has implicit side-effects on variables time
and value, and on the collection queue. Together, these fea-
tures make it challenging to ensure that the mergeM pre-
serves changes from both variants and does not introduce
any new behavior.
To verify semantic conflict-freedom, our techinque repre-
sents the changes formally using a list of edits over a shared
program with holes. Figure 4 shows the shared program Sˆ
along with the corresponding edits ∆O ,∆A ,∆B ,∆M . A hole
(denoted as <?HOLE?>) in Sˆ is a placeholder for a statement.
The shared program captures the statements that are com-
mon to all the four versions (O,A, B andM), and the holes
in Sˆ represent program fragments that differ between the
program versions. An edit ∆P for program version P rep-
resents a list of statements that will be substituted into the
holes of the shared program to obtain P.
Given this representation, we express semantic conflict-
freedom as an assertion for each of the return variables (in
this case, global variables modified by the triggerActions
2
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Shared program with holes (Sˆ)
void triggerActions(long targetTimeInNanos) {
while (!queue.isEmpty()) {
TimedAction current = queue.peek();
if (current.time > targetTimeInNanos) {
<?HOLE?>;
break; }
time = current.time; queue.remove();
<?HOLE?>;
}
<?HOLE?>;
} Edit O (∆O)
[ time = targetTimeInNanos , current.action.call(...), skip ]
Edit A (∆A )
[ skip, current.action.call(...), time = targetTimeInNanos ]
Edit B (∆B)
[ time = targetTimeInNanos ,
if(!current.isCancelled.get()) { current.action.call(...);},
skip ]
EditM (∆M )
[ skip,
if(!current.isCancelled.get()) { current.action.call(...); },
time = targetTimeInNanos ]
Figure 4. Shared program with holes and the edits.
method). Since the triggerActions method modifies time,
value and queue, we add an assertion for each of these vari-
ables. For instance, we add the following assertion on the
value of time at exit from the four versions:
(timeO = timeB = timeA = timeM )
∨((timeO , timeA ⇒ timeA = timeM )∧
(timeO , timeB ⇒ timeB = timeM )
)
This assertion states that either (i) all four versions have
identical side-effects on time, or (ii) if the side-effect on
timeA (resp. timeB) differs from timeO , then timeM in
the merge should have identical side-effect as timeA (resp.
timeB). We add similar assertions for value and queue.
To prove these assertions, our method assumes that all
four versions start out in identical states and then gener-
ates a relational postcondition (RPC) ψ such that the merge
is semantically conflict-free ifψ logically implies the added
assertions. Our RPC generation engine reasons about modi-
fications over the base program by differentiating between
three kinds of statements:
Shared statements. We summarize the behavior of shared
statements using straight-line code snippets of the form
y = f (x1, . . . ,xn) where f is an uninterpreted function. Es-
sentially, such a statement indicates that the value of variable
y is some (unknown) function of variables x1, . . . ,xn . These
“summaries" are generated using lightweight dependence
analysis and allow our method to perform abstract reasoning
over unchanged program fragments.
Program version Pv := (Sˆ,∆)
Edit ∆ := [ ] | S :: ∆
Stmt with hole Sˆ := [·] | A | Sˆ1; Sˆ2 | C ? {Sˆ1} : {Sˆ2}
| while(C) {Sˆ}
Stmt S := A | S1;S2 | C ? {S1} : {S2}
| while(C) {S}
Atom A := skip | x := e | x[e1] := e2
Figure 5. Representation of program versions. Here, :: de-
notes list concatanation, and e and C represent expressions
and predicates respectively.
Holes. When our RPC generation engine encounters a hole
in the shared program, it performs precise relational reason-
ing about different modifications by computing a 4-way prod-
uct program of the edits. As is well-known in the relational
verification literature [12, 13], a product program P1 × P2
is semantically equivalent to P1; P2 but is constructed in a
way that facilitates the verification task. However, because
product construction can result in a significant blow-up in
program size, our technique generates mini-products by con-
sidering each hole in isolation rather than constructing a
full-fledged product of the four program versions.
Loops. Our RPC generation engine infers relational loop in-
variants for loops that contain edited program fragments.
For instance, our method infers that (i) timeO = timeB and
timeA = timeM , (ii) valueO = valueA and valueB =
valueM , and (iii) the state of collection queue is identical in
all four versions for the shared loop from Figure 4.
Using these ideas, our method is able to automatically
generate an RPC that implies semantic conflict-freedom of
this example. Furthermore, the entire procedure is push-
button, including the generation of edits, RPC computation,
and relational loop invariant generation.
3 Representation of Program Versions
In this section, we describe our representation of program
versions as edits applied to a shared program with holes. As
shown in Figure 5, a program version Pv is a pair (Sˆ,∆)
where Sˆ is a statement with holes (i.e., missing statements)
and an edit ∆ is a list of statements (without holes). Given
a program version Pv = (Sˆ,∆), we can obtain a full pro-
gram P = Sˆ[∆] by applying the edit ∆ to Sˆ according to
the ApplyEdit procedure of Figure 6. Effectively, ApplyEdit
traverses the AST in depth-first order and replaces each hole
with the next statement in the edit. Given n related programs
P1, . . . ,Pn , we assume the existence of a diff procedure that
generates a shared program Sˆ as well as n edits ∆1, . . . ,∆n
such that ∀i ∈ [1,n]. ApplyEdit(Sˆ,∆i ) = Pi . Since this diff
procedure is orthogonal to our verification algorithm, we
defer the discussion of our diff procedure until Section 6.
Since the language from Figure 5 uses standard imperative
language constructs (including arrays), we assume an op-
erational semantics described using judgments of the form
3
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ApplyEdit(Sˆ,∆) = S where(S, [ ]) = Apply(Sˆ,∆)
Apply :: (Sˆ,∆) → (S,∆′)
Apply([·],S :: ∆) = (S,∆)
Apply(A,∆) = (A,∆)
Apply(Sˆ1; Sˆ2,∆) = let (S1,∆1) = Apply(Sˆ1,∆) in
let (S2,∆2) = Apply(Sˆ2,∆1) in
((S1;S2),∆2)
Apply(C ? {Sˆ1} : {Sˆ2},∆) = let (S1,∆1) = Apply(Sˆ1,∆) in
let (S2,∆2) = Apply(Sˆ2,∆1) in
(C ? {S1} : {S2},∆2)
Apply(while(C) {Sˆ},∆) = let (S,∆′) = Apply(Sˆ,∆) in
(while(C) {S},∆′)
Figure 6. Application of edit ∆ to program with holes Sˆ
σ ⊢ S ⇓ σ ′, where σ is a valuation that specifies the values
of free variables in S. Specifically, a valuation is a mapping
from (variable, index) pairs to their corresponding values.
The meaning of this judgment is that evaluating S under σ
yields a new valuation σ ′. In the rest of this paper, we also
assume the existence of a special array called out that serves
as the return value of the program. Any behavior that the
programmer considers relevant (e.g., side effects or writing
to the console) can be captured by storing the relevant values
into this out array.
4 Semantic Conflict Freedom
In this section, we first introduce syntactic conflict-freedom,
which corresponds to the criterion used by many existing
merge tools. We then explain why it falls short and formally
describe the more robust notion of semantic conflict-freedom.
Definition 4.1. (Syntactic conflict freedom) Suppose that
we are given four program versions O = (Sˆ,∆O), A =
(Sˆ,∆A), B = (Sˆ,∆B),M = (Sˆ,∆M) representing the base
program, the two variants, and the merge candidate respec-
tively. We say that the merge candidateM is syntactically
conflict free if the following conditions are satisfied for all
i ∈ [0,n), where n denotes the number of holes in Sˆ:
1. If ∆O[i] , ∆A[i], then ∆M[i] = ∆A[i]
2. If ∆O[i] , ∆B[i], then ∆M[i] = ∆B[i]
3. Otherwise, ∆O[i] = ∆A[i] = ∆B[i] = ∆M[i]
Intuitively, the above definition states that the candidate
merge M makes the same syntactic change as variant A
(resp. B) whenever A (resp. B) differs from O. While this
definition may seem intuitively sensible, it does not accu-
rately capture what it means for a merge candidate to be
correct. In particular, some incorrect merges may be conflict-
free according to the above definition, while some correct
merges may be rejected.
Example 4.2. Consider Sˆ = [·]; [·];out[0] := x and the edits
∆O = [skip, skip], ∆A = [x := x + 1, skip], ∆B = [skip,x :=
x + 1], and M = [x := x + 1;x := x + 1]. Observe that
applying these edits to Sˆ yields the same programs given
in Figure 1. These programs are conflict-free according to
the syntactic criterion given in Definition 4.1, but the merge
is clearly incorrect (both variants increment x by 1, but the
merge candidate ends up incrementing x by 2).
The above example illustrates that a syntactic notion of
conflict freedom is not suitable for ruling out incorrectmerges.
Similarly, Definition 4.1 can also result in the rejection of
perfectly valid merge candidates.
Example 4.3. Consider the base program x > 0 ? {y := 1} :
{y := 0}; out[0] := y. Suppose this program has a bug that is
caused by using the wrong predicate, so one variant fixes the
bug by swapping the then and else branches, and the other
variant changes the predicate from x > 0 to x ≤ 0. Clearly,
choosing either variant as the merge would be acceptable
because they are semantically equivalent. However, there is
no merge candidate that can satisfy Definition 4.1 because
the shared program is [·];out[0] := y and the two variants
fill the hole in syntactically conflicting ways.
Based on the shortcomings of syntactic conflict freedom,
we instead propose the following semantic variant:
Definition 4.4. (Semantic conflict freedom) Suppose that
we are given four program versions O,A,B,M represent-
ing the base program, its two variants, and the merge candi-
date respectively. We say thatM is semantically conflict-free,
if for all valuations σ such that:
σ ⊢ O ⇓ σO σ ⊢ A ⇓ σA σ ⊢ B ⇓ σB σ ⊢ M ⇓ σM
the following conditions hold for all i: 3
1. If σO[(out , i)] , σA [(out , i)], then σM [(out , i)] = σA [(out , i)]
2. If σO[(out , i)] , σB[(out , i)], then σM [(out , i)] = σB[(out , i)]
3. Otherwise,σO[(out , i)] = σA [(out , i)] = σB[(out , i)] = σM [(out , i)]
In contrast to syntactic conflict freedom, Definition 4.4
requires agreement between the values that are returned
by the program. Specifically, it says that, if the i’th value
returned by variant A (resp. B) differs from the i’th value
returned by base, then the i’th return value of the merge
should agree with A (resp. B). According to this definition,
the merge candidate from Example 4.2 is not conflict-free
because it returns 2 whereas both variants return 1. Further-
more, for Example 4.3, we can find a merge candidate (e.g.,
one of the variants) that satisfies semantic conflict freedom.
5 Verifying Semantic Conflict Freedom
We now turn our attention to the verification algorithm for
proving semantic conflict-freedom. The high-level structure
of the verification algorithm is quite simple and is shown in
Algorithm 1. It takes as input a shared program (with holes)
Sˆ, an edit ∆1 for the base program, edits ∆2,∆3 for the vari-
ants, and an edit ∆4 for the merge candidate. Conceptually,
the algorithm consists of three steps:
3We assume that out [i] is a special value ⊥ if (out, i) < dom(σ )
4
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Algorithm 1 Algorithm for verifying conflict freedom
1: procedure Verify(Sˆ,∆1,∆2,∆3,∆4)
2: assume vars({Sˆ[∆1], . . . , Sˆ[∆4]}) = V
3: φ := (V1 = V2 ∧V1 = V3 ∧V1 = V4)
4: ψ := RelationalPost(Sˆ,∆1,∆2,∆3,∆4,φ)
5: χ1 := ∀i . (out1[i] , out2[i] ⇒ out2[i] = out4[i])
6: χ2 := ∀i . (out1[i] , out3[i] ⇒ out3[i] = out4[i])
7: χ2 := ∀i . (out1[i] = out2[i] = out3[i] = out4[i])
8: returnψ |= (χ1 ∧ χ2) ∨ χ3
Precondition. Algorithm 1 starts by generating a pre-condition
φ (line 3) stating that all variables initially have the same
value. 4 Note that V1 denotes the variables in the base pro-
gram, V2,V3 denote variables in the variants, and V4 refers
to variables in the merge candidate. We use the notation
Vi = Vj as short-hand for ∀v ∈ V . vi = vj .
RPC computation. The next step of the algorithm is to
compute a relational post-condition ψ of φ with respect to
the four program versions (line 4). Such a relational post-
conditionψ states relationships between variables V1,V2,V3,
and V4 and has the property that it is also post-condition
of the program (Sˆ[∆1])[V1/V ]; . . . ; (Sˆ[∆4])[V4/V ]. We will
explain the RelationalPost procedure in detail shortly.
Checking conflict freedom. The last step of the algorithm
checks whether the relational post-conditionψ logically im-
plies semantic conflict freedom (line 8). Specifically, observe
that the constraint (χ1 ∧ χ2) ∨ χ3 encodes precisely the three
conditions fromDefinition 4.4, so the program is conflict-free
ifψ implies (χ1 ∧ χ2) ∨ χ3.
5.1 Computing Relational Postconditions
Since the core part of the verification algorithm is the com-
putation of RPCs, we now describe the RelationalPost pro-
cedure. As mentioned in Section 1, the key idea is to analyze
edits in a precise way by constructing product programs,
but perform lightweight reasoning for shared program parts
using dependence analysis.
Our RPC generation engine is described in Figure 7 using
judgments ®∆,φ ⊢ Sˆ : φ ′, ®∆′. Here,φ is a precondition relating
variables in different program versions, and ®∆ is a vector of
n edits applied to a shared base program Sˆ. The meaning of
this judgment is that the following Hoare triple is valid:
{φ} Sˆ[∆1][V1/V ]; . . . ; Sˆ[∆n][Vn/V ] {φ ′}
In other words, φ ′ is a sound relational post-condition of
the four program versions with respect to precondition φ.
Since the edits in ®∆ may contain more statements than there
4Observe that this precondition also applies to local variables, not just
arguments, and allows our technique to handle cases in which one of the
variants introduces a new variable.
(1) S = head(∆1)[V1/V ] ⊛ . . . ⊛ head(∆4)[V4/V ]®∆,φ ⊢ [·] : post(S,φ), [tail(∆1), . . . , tail(∆4)]
(2)
Modifies(S) = {y1, . . . ,yn }
®xi = Dependencies(S,yi )
Si = (yi := Fi ( ®xi ))[V1/V ]; . . . ; (yi := Fi ( ®xi ))[V4/V ]
®∆,φ ⊢ S : post(S1; . . . ;Sn ,φ), ®∆
(3)
®∆,φ ⊢ Sˆ1 : φ ′, ®∆′ ®∆′,φ ′ ⊢ Sˆ2 : φ ′′, ®∆′′
®∆,φ ⊢ Sˆ1; Sˆ2 : φ ′′, ®∆′′
(4)
φ |= ∧i, j C[Vi/V ] ↔ C[Vj/V ]
®∆,φ ∧C[V1/V ] ⊢ Sˆ1 : φ ′, ®∆′
®∆′,φ ∧ ¬C[V1/V ] ⊢ Sˆ2 : φ ′′, ®∆′′
®∆,φ ⊢ C ? {Sˆ1} : {Sˆ2} : φ ′ ∨ φ ′′, ®∆′′
(5)
φ |= I ®∆,I ∧∧i C[Vi/V ] ⊢ Sˆ : I ′, ®∆′ I ′ |= I
I |= ∧i, j C[Vi/V ] ↔ C[Vj/V ]
®∆,φ ⊢ while(C) Sˆ : I ∧∧i ¬C[Vi/V ], ®∆′
(6)
S = (Sˆ[∆1])[V1/V ] ⊛ . . . ⊛ (Sˆ[∆4])[V4/V ]
∆i = (∆1i :: ∆2i ) (|∆1i | = numHoles(Sˆ))
®∆,φ ⊢ Sˆ : post(S,φ), [∆21, . . . ,∆24]
Figure 7. RPC inference
are holes in Sˆ, we use ®∆′ to denote the remaining edits that
were not “used” while analyzing Sˆ.
Let us now consider the rules in Figure 7 in more detail.
The first rule corresponds to the case where we encounter
a hole in the shared program and need to analyze the edits.
In this case, we construct a “mini” product program S that
describes the simultaneous execution of the edits. As we will
see in Section 5.2, an n-way product program S1 ⊛ . . . ⊛ Sn
is semantically equivalent to the sequential composition
S1; . . . ;Sn but has the advantage of being easier to ana-
lyze. Given such a “mini product” S, our RPC generation
engine computes the post-condition ofS in the standard way
using a post function, where post(S,φ) yields a sound post-
condition of φ with respect to S. Since S may contain loops
in the general case, the computation of post may require loop
invariant generation. As we discuss in Section 5.2, the key
advantage of constructing a product program is to facilitate
loop invariant generation using standard techniques.
Rule (2) corresponds to the case where we encounter a pro-
gram fragment S without holes. Since S has not been mod-
ified by any of the variants, we analyze S in a lightweight
way using dependence analysis. Specifically, for each vari-
ableyi that is modified by S, we compute the set of variables
x1, . . . ,xk that it depends on. We then “summarize” the be-
havior of S using statements of the form yi = Fi (x1, . . . ,xk )
where Fi is a fresh uninterpreted function symbol. Hence,
rather than analyzing the entire code fragment S (which
5
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could potentially be very large), we analyze its behavior in
a lightweight way by modeling it as straight-line code over
uninterpreted functions. 5
Rule (3) for sequencing is similar to its corresponding
proof rule in standard Hoare logic: Given a statement Sˆ1; Sˆ2,
we first compute the relational post-condition φ ′ of Sˆ1 and
then use φ ′ as the precondition for Sˆ2. Since Sˆ1 and Sˆ2 may
contain edits nested inside them, this proof rule combines
reasoning about Sˆ1 and Sˆ2 in a precise, yet lightweight way,
without constructing a 4-way product for the entire program.
Rule (4) allows us to analyze conditionals C ? {Sˆ1} : {Sˆ2}
in a modular way whenever possible. As in the sequenc-
ing case, we would like to analyze Sˆ1 and Sˆ2 in isolation
and then combine the results. Unfortunately, such composi-
tional reasoning is only possible if all program versions take
the same path. For instance, consider the shared program
[·];x > 0 ? {y := 1} : {y := 2} and two versions A,B given
by the edits [x := y] and [x := z]. Since A could take the
then branch while B takes the else branch (or vice versa),
we need to reason about all possible combinations of paths.
Hence, the first premise of this rule checks whether each
C[Vi/V ] can be proven to be equivalent to all otherC[Vj/V ]’s
under precondition φ. If this is the case, all program versions
take the same path, so we can reason compositionally. Oth-
erwise, our analysis falls back upon the conservative, but
non-modular, proof rule (6) that we will explain shortly.
Rule (5) uses inductive relational invariants for loops that
have been edited in different ways by each program variant.
Specifically, the first premise of this rule states that the rela-
tional invariant I is implied by the loop pre-condition, and
the next two premises enforce that I is preserved by the
loop body (i.e., I is inductive). Thus, assuming that all loops
execute the same number of times (checked by line 2 of rule
5), we can conclude that I ∧ ∧i ¬C[Vi/V ] holds after the
loop. Note that rule (5) does not describe how to compute
such relational loop invariants; it simply asserts that I is
inductive. As we describe in Section 7, our implementation
uses standard techniques based on conjunctive predicate
abstraction to infer such relational loop invariants.
Rule (6) allows us to fall back upon non-modular reasoning
when it is not sound to analyze edits in a compositional
way. Given a statement Sˆ with holes, rule (6) constructs the
product program (Sˆ[∆1])[V1/V ] ⊛ . . . ⊛ (Sˆ[∆4])[V4/V ] and
computes its post-condition in the standard way. While rule
(6) is a generalization of rule (1), it is only used in cases where
compositional reasoning is unsound, as product construction
can cause a blow up in program size.
Theorem5.1. (Soundness of relational post-condition) 6
Let Sˆ be a shared program with holes and ®∆ be the edits
5There are rare cases in which this abstraction would lead to imprecision.
Section 7 describes how our implementation handles such cases.
6 Proofs of all theorems are available in the Appendix.
such that |∆i | = numHoles(Sˆ). Let φ ′ be the result of call-
ing RelationalPost(Sˆ, ®∆,φ) (i.e., ®∆,φ ⊢ Sˆ : φ ′, [] according to
Figure 7). Then, the following Hoare triple is valid:
{φ} (Sˆ[∆1])[V1/V ]; . . . ; (Sˆ[∆n])[Vn/V ] {φ ′}
5.2 Construction of Product Programs
In this section, we describe our method for constructing n-
way product programs. While there are several strategies
for generating 2-way product programs in the literature
(e.g., [12, 13]), our method differs from these approaches in
that it uses similarity metrics to guide product construction
and also generalizes these techniques to n-way products.
The use of similarity metrics allows our method to gener-
ate more verification-friendly product programs while ob-
viating the need for performing backtracking search over
non-deterministic product construction rules.
Before we describe our product construction technique,
we first give a simple example to illustrate how product
construction facilitates relational verification:
Example 5.2. Consider the following programs S1 and S2:
S1 : i1 := 0; while(i1 < n1) {i1 := i1 ∗ x1}
S2 : i2 := 0; while(i2 < n2) {i2 := i2 ∗ x2}
and the precondition n1 = n2 ∧ x1 = x2. It is easy to see that
i1 and i2 will have the same value after executing S1 and
S2. Now, consider analyzing the program S1;S2. While a
static analyzer can in principle infer this post-condition by
coming up with a precise loop invariant that captures the
exact symbolic value of i1 and i2 during each iteration, this
is clearly a very difficult task. To see why product programs
are useful, now consider the following program S:
(1) i1 := 0; i2 := 0;
(2) while(i1 < n1 ∧ i2 < n2) {i1 := i1 ∗ x1; i2 := i2 ∗ x2; }
(3) (i1 < n1)?{while(i1 < n1) {i1 := i1 ∗ x1}}
: {(i2 < n2)?{while(i2 < n2) {i2 := i2 ∗ x2}} : {skip}}
Here,S is equivalent toS1;S2 because it executes both loops
in lockstep until one of them terminates and then executes
the remainder of the other loop. While this code may look
complicated, it is much easier to statically reason about S
than S1;S2. In particular, since i1 = i2 ∧ x1 = x2 ∧n1 = n2 is
an inductive invariant of the first loop in S, we can easily
prove that line (3) is dead code and that i1 = i2 is a valid post-
condition ofS. As this example illustrates, product programs
can make relational verification easier by executing loops
from different programs in lockstep.
Our n-way product construction method is presented in
Figure 8 using inference rules that derive judgments of the
form ⊢ S1 ⊛ . . . ⊛ Sn ⇝ S where programs S1, . . . ,Sn do
not share any variables (i.e., each Si refers to variables Vi
such that Vi ∩Vj = ∅ for i , j). The generated product S is
semantically equivalent to S1; . . . ;Sn but is constructed in
a way that makes S easier to be statically analyzed. Similar
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(1) ⊢ S1 ⊛ P
⊛ ⇝ S
⊢ A;S1 ⊛ P⊛ ⇝ A;S
(2) ⊢ St ;S1 ⊛ P
⊛ ⇝ S′ ⊢ Se ;S1 ⊛ P⊛ ⇝ S′′
⊢ (C ? {St } : {Se });S1 ⊛ P⊛ ⇝ (C ? {S′} : {S′′})
(3)
∃Si ∈ P. Si [0] , while(Ci ) {SBi }
⊢ Si ⊛ (P \ Si)⊛ ⊛ (while(C1) {SB1 });S1 ⇝ S
⊢ (while(C1) {SB1 });S1 ⊛ P⊛ ⇝ S
(4)
∀Si ∈ P. Si [0] = while(Ci ) {SBi }∃H ⊆ P. ∀L ⊆ P. sim(H) ≥ sim(L)
⊢ (H[0])⊛ ⇝ S′ ⊢ (H[1 . . .])⊛ ⊛ (P \ H)⊛ ⇝ S′′
P⊛ ⇝ S′;S′′
(5)
⊢ SB1 ⊛ SB2 ⇝ S
W := while(C1 ∧C2) {S}
R := C1 ? {while(C1) {SB1 }} : {(C2 ? {while(C2) {SB2 }} : {skip})}
⊢W ;R ⊛ P⊛ ⇝ S′
⊢ (while(C1) {SB1 }) ⊛ (while(C2) {SB2 }) ⊛ P⊛ ⇝ S′
Figure 8. Product construction. The base case is the trivial
rule ⊢ S⇝ S, and we assume that every program ends in a
skip and that skip ⊛ P⊛ is the same as P⊛ .
to prior relational verification techniques, the key idea is
to synchronize loops from different program versions as
much as possible. However, our method differs from existing
techniques in that it uses similarity metrics to guide product
construction and generalizes them to n-way products.
Notation. Before discussing Figure 8, we first introduce
some useful notation: We abbreviate S1 ⊛ . . . ⊛Sn using the
notation P⊛ , and we write P to denote the list (S1, . . . ,Sn).
Also, given a statement S, we write S[i] to denote the i’th
element in the sequence (i.e., S[0] denotes the first element).
Similaritymetric.Asmentioned earlier, our algorithm uses
similarity metrics between different program fragments to
guide product construction. Thus, our algorithm is parame-
terized by a function sim : S∗ → IR+0 that returns a positive
real number representing similarity between different state-
ments. While the precise definition of sim is orthogonal to
our product construction algorithm, our implementation
uses Levensthein distance as the similarity metric.
Product construction algorithm.We are now ready to ex-
plain the product construction rules shown in Figure 8. Rule
(1) is quite simple and deals with the case where the first
program starts with an atomic statement A. Since we can
always compute a precise post-condition for atomic state-
ments, it is not necessary to “synchronize” Awith any of the
statements from other programs. Therefore, we first com-
pute the product program S1 ⊛ P⊛ , i.e. S1 ⊛ S2 ⊛ . . . ⊛ Sn ,
and then sequentially compose it with A.
Rule (2) considers the case where the first program starts
with a conditional C ? {St } : {Se }. In general, St and Se
may contain loops; therefore, there may be an opportunity to
synchronize any loops withinSt andSe with loops from P =
S2, . . . ,Sn . Therefore, we construct the product program as
C ? {S′} : {S′′} where S′ (resp. S′′) is the product of the
then (resp. else) branch with P⊛ . 7
Because the main point of product construction is to gen-
erate a verification-friendly program by executing loops in
lock-step, all of the remaining rules deal with loops. Specifi-
cally, rule (3) considers the casewhere the first program starts
with a loop but there is some programSi in P = (S2, . . . ,Sn)
that does not start with a loop. In this case, we want to “get
rid of” program Si by using rules (1) and (2); thus, we move
Si to the beginning and construct the product program S
for Si ⊛ (P\Si )⊛ ⊛ while(C1) {SB1 };S1.
Before we continue to the other rules, we make two impor-
tant observations about rule (3). First, this rule exploits the
commutativity and associativity of the ⊛ operator 8; how-
ever, it uses these properties in a restricted form by applying
them only where they are useful. Second, after exhaustively
applying rules (1), (2), and (3) on some P⊛0 , note that we
will end up with a new P⊛1 where all programs in P1 are
guaranteed to start with a loop.
Rule (4) considers the case where all programs start with a
loop and utilizes the similarity metric sim to identify which
loops to synchronize. In particular, let H be the subset of
the programs in P that are “most similar" according to our
similarity metric. Since all programs in H start with a loop,
we first construct the product program S′ of these loops. We
then construct the product program S′′ for the remaining
programs P\H and the remaining parts of the programs inH .
The final rule (5) defines what it means to “execute loops
in lockstep as much as possible”. Given two programs that
start with loops while(C1) {S1} and while(C2) {S2}, we first
construct the productS1⊛S2 and generate the synchronized
loop aswhile(C1∧C2) {S1⊛S2}. Since these loopsmay not ex-
ecute the same number of times, we still need to generate the
“continuation” R, which executes any remaining iterations of
one of the loops. Thus,W ;R in rule (5) is semantically equiv-
alent to while(C1) {S1}; while(C2) {S2}. Now, since there
may be further synchronization opportunities betweenW ;R
and the remaining programs S3, . . . ,Sn , we obtain the final
product program by computingW ;R ⊛ S3 ⊛ . . . ⊛ Sn .
Example 5.3. Consider again the programs S1 and S2 from
Example 5.2. We can use rules (1) and (5) from Figure 8 to
compute the product program for S1 ⊛ S2. The resulting
product is exactly the program S shown in Example 5.2.
Since rules (4) or (5) are both applicable when all programs
start with a loop, our product construction algorithm first
applies rule (4) and then uses rule (5) when constructing the
7Observe that our handling of if statements can cause a blow-up in program
size, since we essentially embed the continuation S1 inside the then and
else branches. However, because our product construction applies to small
program fragments, we have not found it to be a problem in practice.
8Recall that different programs do not share variables
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Algorithm 2 n-way AST differencing algorithm
1: procedure NDiff(S1, . . . ,Sn )
2: Sˆ ← S1; ®∆← []; i ← 2;
3: while i ≤ n do
4: (Sˆ, ®∆) ← GenEdit(Sˆ,Si , ®∆)
5: return (Sˆ, ®∆)
6: procedure GenEdit(Sˆ,S,∆1, . . . ,∆k )
7: (Sˆ′,∆, ∆ˆ) := Diff2(S, Sˆ)
8: for i in [1,k] do
9: ∆′i := Compose(∆ˆ,∆i )
10: return (Sˆ′,∆′1, . . . ,∆′k ,∆)
11: procedure Compose(∆ˆ,∆)
12: if ∆ˆ = [ ] then return [ ]
13: else if head(∆ˆ) = [·] then
14: return head(∆) :: Compose(tail(∆ˆ), tail(∆))
15: else return head(∆ˆ) :: Compose(tail(∆ˆ),∆)
product for (H [0])⊛ in rule (4). Thus, our method ensures
that loops that are most similar to each other are executed
in lockstep, which in turn greatly facilitates verification.
Theorem 5.4. (Soundness of product) Let S1, . . . ,Sn be
statements with disjoint variables, and let ⊢ S1⊛ . . .⊛Sn ⇝ S
according to Figure 8. Then, for all valuations σ , we have
σ ⊢ S1; . . . ;Sn ⇓ σ ′ iff σ ⊢ S ⇓ σ ′.
6 Edit Generation
The verification algorithm we described in Section 5 requires
all program versions to be represented as edits applied to
a shared program with holes. This representation is very
important because it allows our verification algorithm to
reason about modifications to different program parts in a
compositional way. In this section, we describe an n-way
AST differencing algorithm that can be used to generate the
desired program representation.
Our n-way diff algorithm is presented in Algorithm 2.
Procedure NDiff takes as input n programs S1, . . . ,Sn and
returns a pair (Sˆ, ®∆)where Sˆ is a shared program with holes
and ®∆ is a list of edits such that Sˆ[∆i ] = Si . The loop inside
the NDiff procedure maintains the key invariant ∀j . 1 ≤ j <
i ⇒ Sˆ[∆j ] = Sj . Thus, upon termination, NDiff guarantees
that Sˆ[∆i ] = Si for all i ∈ [1,n].
The bulk of the work of the NDiff procedure is performed
by the auxiliary GenEdit function, which uses a 2-way AST
differencing algorithm to extend the diff from k to k + 1
programs. Specifically,GenEdit takes as input a new program
S as well as the diff of the first k programs, where the diff
is represented as a shared program Sˆ with holes as well as
edits ∆1, . . . ,∆k . The key idea underlying GenEdit is to use
a standard 2-way AST diff algorithm to compute the diff
between Sˆ and the new program S and then use the result
to update the existing edits ∆1, . . . ,∆k .
In more detail, the Diff2 procedure used in GenEdit yields
the 2-way diff of Sˆ and S as a triple (Sˆ′,∆, ∆ˆ) such that
Sˆ′[∆] = S and Sˆ′[∆ˆ] = Sˆ. 9 The core insight underlying
GenEdit is to use ∆ˆ to update the existing edits ∆1, . . . ,∆k
for the first k programs. Specifically, we use a procedure
Compose to combine each existing edit ∆i with the output ∆ˆ
of 2Diff. The Compose procedure is defined recursively and
inspects the first element of ∆ˆ in each recursive call. If the
first element is a hole, we preserve the existing edit; other-
wise, we use the edit from ∆ˆ. Thus, if Compose(∆ˆ,∆i ) yields
∆′i , we have Sˆ′[∆′i ] = Sˆ[∆i ]. In other words, the Compose
procedure allows us to update the diff of the first k programs
to generate a sound diff of k + 1 programs.
Theorem6.1. (Soundness ofNDiff) LetNDiff(S1, . . . ,Sn)
be (Sˆ, ®∆). Then we have ∆ˆ[∆i ] = Si for all i ∈ [1,n].
7 Implementation
We implemented the techniques proposed in this paper in
a tool called SafeMerge for checking semantic conflict-
freedom of Java programs. SafeMerge is written in Haskell
and uses the Z3 SMT solver [16]. In what follows, we describe
relational invariant generation, our handling of various as-
pects of the Java language and other implementation choices.
Relational invariant generation. The RPC computation
engine from Section 5.1 requires an inductive loop invariant
relating variables from the four program versions. Our im-
plementation automatically infers relational loop invariants
using the Houdini framework for (monomial) predicate ab-
straction [20]. Specifically, we consider predicate templates
of the form xi = x j relating values of the same variable
from different program versions, and compute the strongest
conjunct that satisfies the conditions of rule (5) of Figure 7.
Modeling the heap and collections. As standard in prior
verification literature [21], we model each field f in the pro-
gram as follows:We introduce amap f from object identifiers
to values and model reads and writes to the map using the
select and update functions in the theory of arrays. Similarly,
our implementation models collections, such as ArrayList
and Queue, using arrays. Specifically, we use an array to rep-
resent the contents of the collection and use scalar variables
to model the size of the collection as well as the current
position of an iterator over the collection [17].
Side effects of a method. Our formalization uses an out
array to model all relevant side effects of a method. Since
real Java programs do not contain such a construct, our
implementation checks semantic conflict freedom on the
9Existing 2-way AST diff algorithms can be adapted to produce diffs in this
form. We provide ourDiff2 implementation under supplementary materials.
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method’s return value, the final state of the receiver object
as well as any field modified in the method.
Analysis of shared statements. Recall that our technique
abstracts away shared program statements using uninter-
preted functions (rule (2) from Figure 7). However, because
unconditional use of such abstraction can result in false
positives, our implementation checks for certain conditions
before applying rule (2) from Figure 7. Specifically, given pre-
condition ϕ and variables V accessed by shared statement
S , our implementation applies rule (2) only when ϕ implies
semantic conflict freedom on all variables in set V ; other-
wise, our implementation falls back on product construction
(i.e., rule (6) from Figure 7). While this check fails rarely in
practice, it is nonetheless useful for avoiding false positives.
7.1 Limitations
Our current prototype implementation has a few limitations:
Analysis scope. Because SafeMerge only analyzes the class
file associated with the modified procedure, it may suffer
from both false positives and negatives. In particular, our
analysis results are only sound under the assumption that the
external callees from other classes have not been modified.
Changes to method signature. SafeMerge currently does
not support renamed methods or methods with parameter
reordering, introduction, or deletion. However, our tool does
not place any requirements on the mapping of local variables.
Similarly, new fields can be introduced or deleted in different
variants — we assume they are present in all four versions
and that they start out in an arbitrary but equal state.
Concurrency, termination, and exceptions. Neither our
formalism nor our prototype implementation support sound
reasoning in the presence of concurrency. Our soundness
claims also rely on the assumption that none of the variants
introduce non-terminating behavior. Finally, although excep-
tions can be conceptually desugared in our formalism, our
implementation does not handle exceptional control flow.
8 Experimental Evaluation
To assess the usefulness of the proposed method, we perform
a series of three experiments. In our first experiment, we use
SafeMerge to verify semantic conflict-freedom of merges
collected from Github commit histories. In our second exper-
iment, we run SafeMerge on erroneous merge candidates
generated by kdiff3 [2], a widely-used textual merge tool.
Finally, in our third experiment, we assess the scalability of
our method and the importance of various design choices.
All experiments are performed on Quad-core Intel Xeon CPU
with 2.4 GHz and 8 GB memory.
8.1 Evaluation on Merge Candidates from Github
To perform our first experiment, we implemented a crawler
that examines git merge commit histories and extracts in-
teresting methods that have the potential to violate conflict
freedom. Specifically, our crawler considers a merge scenario
to be relevant if (a) a method is modified by both variants
in different ways, (b) this method involves externally visible
side effects 10, (c) the merge candidate is different from either
of the variants, and (d) the code does not involve features
that are not handled by our prototype.
To perform this experiment, we run our crawler on nine
popular Java applications, namely Elasticsearch [18], libGDX [4],
iosched [1], kotlin [3], MPAndroidChart [5], okhttp [6], retro-
fit [7], RxJava [8] and the Spring Boot framework [9]. Out
of 1998 merge instances where a Java source file is modi-
fied in both variants, 235 cases involve modifications to the
same method where the merge differs from Base, A and B.
After filtering methods with no side-effects or containing
unhandled features, we obtain a total of 52 benchmarks and
evaluate SafeMerge on all of them. 11
Main results. The results of our evaluation are presented
in Table 1. For each benchmark, Table 1 shows the abbrevi-
ated name of the application it is taken from (column “App”),
the number of lines of code in the merge candidate (“LOC”),
the running time of SafeMerge in seconds (“Time”), and
the results produced by SafeMerge and kdiff3. Specifically,
for SafeMerge, a checkmark (✓) indicates that it was able
to verify semantic conflict-freedom, whereas ✗ means that
it produced a warning. In the case of kdiff3, a checkmark
indicates the absence of syntactic conflicts.
As we can see from Table 1, SafeMerge is able to verify
semantic conflict-freedom for 39 of the 52 benchmarks and re-
ports a warning for the remaining 13. Wemanually inspected
these thirteen benchmarks and found eleven instances of an
actual semantic conflict (i.e., the merge candidate is indeed
incorrect with respect to Definition 4.4). The remaining two
warnings are false positives caused by imprecision in the
dependence analysis and modeling of collections. In all, these
results indicate that SafeMerge is quite precise, with a false
positive rate around 15%. Furthermore, this experiment also
corroborates that SafeMerge is practical, taking an average
of 0.5 second to verify each benchmark.
Next, Table 2 compares the results produced by Safe-
Merge and kdiff3 on the 52 benchmarks used in our evalu-
ation. This comparison is very relevant because the merge
candidate in these benchmarks matches exactly the merge
produced by kdiff3 whenever it does not report a textual
conflict. As shown in Table 2, 33 benchmarks are classified as
conflict-free by both SafeMerge and kdiff3, meaning that
SafeMerge can verify the correctness of the textual merge
generated by kdiff3 in these cases. For instance, the merge
with ID 41 in Table 1 corresponds precisely to the example
from RxJava present in Section 2 ( Figure 3). Perhaps more
interestingly, we find five benchmarks for which kdiff3
10Our crawler considers a method to have side-effects if it its return value
is not void or if it makes an assignment to a field.
11All benchmarks can be found under supplementary materials.
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ID App LOC Time (s) Result(SafeMerge)
Result
(kdiff3) ID App LOC Time (s)
Result
(SafeMerge)
Result
(kdiff3)
1 ESearch 18 0.05 ✓ ✗ 27 libgdx 30 0.12 ✓ ✓
2 ESearch 25 0.07 ✓ ✓ 28 libgdx 32 0.21 ✓ ✓
3 ESearch 101 0.20 ✓ ✓ 29 libgdx 71 0.16 ✓ ✓
4 ESearch 63 0.49 ✓ ✓ 30 MPAndroid 47 0.44 ✗ ✓
5 ESearch 90 4.45 ✓ ✓ 31 MPAndroid 66 0.17 ✓ ✓
6 ESearch 136 4.07 ✓ ✓ 32 MPAndroid 109 0.16 ✓ ✓
7 ESearch 15 2.09 ✓ ✓ 33 MPAndroid 44 0.10 ✓ ✓
8 ESearch 30 0.11 ✗ ✗ 34 MPAndroid 62 0.16 ✓ ✓
9 ESearch 25 0.09 ✗ ✗ 35 MPAndroid 43 0.11 ✓ ✗
10 ESearch 21 0.15 ✗ ✗ 36 MPAndroid 35 0.23 ✗ ✗
11 iosched 63 0.19 ✓ ✓ 37 MPAndroid 37 0.39 ✗ ✗
12 iosched 64 0.07 ✓ ✓ 38 okhttp 28 0.10 ✗ ✓
13 kotlin 96 0.16 ✗ ✓ 39 retrofit 66 1.67 ✓ ✓
14 kotlin 54 0.57 ✓ ✓ 40 retrofit 78 1.76 ✓ ✓
15 kotlin 53 0.48 ✓ ✓ 41 RxJava 28 0.20 ✓ ✓
16 kotlin 53 0.11 ✓ ✓ 42 spring 107 0.12 ✓ ✓
17 kotlin 104 0.49 ✓ ✓ 43 spring 77 0.23 ✗ ✗
18 kotlin 86 0.31 ✓ ✓ 44 spring 82 0.15 ✓ ✓
19 kotlin 127 4.19 ✓ ✗ 45 spring 81 0.21 ✓ ✓
20 kotlin 56 0.62 ✓ ✓ 46 spring 44 0.15 ✓ ✗
21 kotlin 11 0.06 ✓ ✓ 47 spring 37 0.30 ✓ ✗
22 kotlin 77 0.18 ✓ ✓ 48 spring 42 0.07 ✓ ✓
23 kotlin 11 0.06 ✓ ✓ 49 spring 36 0.06 ✓ ✓
24 kotlin 38 0.15 ✓ ✓ 50 spring 64 0.20 ✗ ✓
25 kotlin 67 0.33 ✓ ✗ 51 spring 13 0.09 ✗ ✗
26 kotlin 7 0.19 ✗ ✗ 52 spring 20 0.05 ✗ ✓
Table 1. Summary of experimental results.
SafeMerge kdiff3 Count Implication
✓ ✓ 33 Verified textual merge
✓ ✗ 6 Verified manual merge
✗ ✓ 5 Fail to verify textual merge
✗ ✗ 8 Fail to verify manual merge
Table 2. Summary of differences between SafeMerge and
kdiff3. “Count” denotes the number of instances in Table 1.
generates a textual merge that is semantically incorrect ac-
cording to SafeMerge. Among these five instances, two
correspond (with IDs 13, 30) to the false positives discussed
earlier, leaving us with three benchmarks where the merge
generated by kdiff3 violates Definition 4.4 and should be
further investigated by the developers.
As we can see from Table 2, there are fourteen bench-
marks that are syntactically conflicting according to kdiff3
and were likely resolved manually by a developer. Among
these, SafeMerge can verify the correctness of the merge
candidate for six instances (spread over four different ap-
plications), thereby confirming the existence of real-world
scenarios where syntactic conflict-freedom results in false
positives. Finally, there are eight cases where the manual
merge cannot be verified SafeMerge. While these examples
indeed violate semantic conflict-freedom, they do not nec-
essarily correspond to bugs (e.g., a developer might have
intentionally discarded changes made by another developer).
For example, in the merge with ID 36 from Table 1, both
variants A and B weaken a predicate in two different ways
by adding two and one additional disjuncts respectively12.
However, the merge M only picks the weaker predicate from
A, thereby effectively discarding some of the changes from
variant B.
8.2 Evaluation on Erroneous Merge Candidates
In our second experiment, we explore whether SafeMerge
is able to pinpoint erroneous merges generated by kdiff3.
To perform this experiment, we consider base program with
ID = 25 from Table 1 and generate variants by performing
various kinds of mutations to the base program. Specifically,
we design pairs of mutations that cause kdiff3 to generate
buggy merge candidates.
The results of this experiment are summarized in Table 3,
where the column labeled “Description" summarizes the na-
ture of the mutation. For each pair of variants that are se-
mantically conflict-free, the version named -kdiff3 shows
the incorrect merge generated by kdiff3, where as the one
labeled -manual shows the correct merge that we generated
manually. For benchmarks that are semantically conflicting,
12Merge commit https://github.com/PhilJay/MPAndroidChart/commit/
9531ba69895cd64fce48038ffd8df2543eeea1d2
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Name Description Time (s) Result
B1-kdiff3 Patch gets duplicated in merge 0.36 ✗
B1-manual Correct version of above 0.38 ✓
B2-kdiff3 Semantically same, syntactically different patches 0.42 ✗
B2-manual Correct version of above 0.33 ✓
B3-kdiff3 Inconsistent changes in assignment (conflict) 0.34 ✗
B4-kdiff3 Interference between refactoring and insertion (conflict) 0.31 ✗
B5-kdiff3 Interference between insertion and deletion (conflict) 0.30 ✗
B6-kdiff3 One patch supercedes the other 0.32 ✗
B6-manual Correct version of above 0.29 ✓
B7-kdiff3 Inconsistent patches due to off-by-one error (conflict) 0.29 ✗
Table 3. Results of our evaluation on merges generated by kdiff3.
Figure 9. Lines of code vs. running time.
we only provide results for the incorrect merge generated
by kdiff3 since a correct merge simply does not exist.
The results from Table 3 complement those from Sec-
tion 8.1 and provide further evidence that a widely-used
merge tool like kdiff3 can generate erroneous merges and
that these buggy merges can be detected by our proposed
technique. This experiment also demonstrates that Safe-
Merge can verify conflict-freedom in the manually con-
structed correct merges.
8.3 Evaluation of Scalability and Design Choices
To assess the scalability of the proposed technique, we per-
formed a third experiment in which we compare the running
time of SafeMerge against the number of lines of code and
number of edits. To perform this experiment, we start with
an existing benchmark from the SafeMerge test suite and
increase the number of lines of code using loop unrolling.
We also vary the number of edits by injecting a modification
in the loop body. This way, the number of holes in the shared
program increases with each loop unrolling.
To evaluate the benefits of the various design choices that
we adopt in this paper, we also compare SafeMerge with
two variants of itself. In one variant, namely Product, we
model the shared program using a single hole, so each edit
corresponds to one of the program versions. Essentially, this
Figure 10. Number of holes (edits) vs. running time. Lines
of code varies between 50 and 800.
method computes the product of the four program versions
using the rules from Figure 8 and allows us to assess the
benefits of representing program versions as edits applied to
a shared program. In another variant called No dependence,
we do not abstract away shared program fragments using
uninterpreted functions and analyze them by constructing a
4-way product. However, we still combine reasoning from
different product programs in a compositional way.
Figure 9 compares the running time of SafeMerge against
these two variants as we vary the number of lines of code
but not the number of edits. Observe that the y-axis is shown
in log scale. As we can see from this plot, SafeMerge scales
quite well and analyzes each benchmark in under a second.
In contrast, the running time of Product grows exponentially
in the lines of code. As expected, the No dependence variant is
better than Product but significantly worse than SafeMerge.
Next, Figure 10 compares the running time of SafeMerge
against Product and No dependence as we vary both the num-
ber of lines of code and the number of edits. Specifically, a
benchmark containing n holes contains 25n lines of code,
and the y-axis shows the running time of each variant in
log scale. As expected, SafeMerge is more sensitive to the
number holes than it is to the number of lines of code be-
cause it abstracts away shared program fragments. However,
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SafeMerge still significantly outperforms both Product and
No Dependence. In particular, for a program with 32 edits and
800 lines of code, SafeMerge can verify semantic conflict
freedom in approximately 10 seconds, while No Dependence
takes approximately 100 seconds and Product times out.
In summary, this experiment shows that SafeMerge scales
well as we vary the lines of code and that its running time is
still feasible when program variants perform over 30 modi-
fications to the base program in this example. This experi-
ments also corroborates the practical importance of repre-
senting program versions as edits applied to a shared pro-
gram as well as the advantage of abstracting away shared
program fragments using uninterpreted functions.
9 Related Work
In this section, we compare our technique with prior work
on program merging and relational verification.
Structure-awaremerge. Most algorithms for programmerg-
ing are textual in nature, hardly ever formally described [29],
and without semantic guarantees. To improve on this sit-
uation, previous work has proposed structured and semi-
structured merge techniques to better resolve merge con-
flicts. For example, FSTMerge [11] uses syntactic structure to
resolve conflicts between AST nodes that can be reordered
(such as method definitions), but it falls back on unstructured
textual merge for other kinds of nodes. Follow-up work on
JDime [10, 33] improves the poor performance of structure-
based merging by using textual-based mode (fast) as long
as no conflicts are detected, but switches to structure-based
mode in the presence of conflicts. However, none of these
techniques guarantee semantic conflict freedom.
Semantics-aware merge. Our work is inspired by earlier
work on program integration, which originated with the HPR
algorithm [25] for checking non-interference and generating
valid merges. The HPR algorithm was later refined by the
work of Yang et al. [43], which is one of the first attempts to
incorporate semantics for merge generation. In that context,
the notion of conflict-freedom is parameterized by a classifi-
cation of nodes of the variants as unchanged such that the
backward slices of unchanged nodes in the two variants are
equivalent modulo a semantic correspondence. Thus, their
classification algorithm is parameterized by a semantic con-
gruence relation. Our approach tackles the slightly different
merge verification (rather then merge generation) problem,
but improves on these prior techniques in several dimensions:
First, we do not require annotations to map statements across
the different versions — this information is computed auto-
matically using our edit generation algorithm (Sec 6). Second,
we show how to formulate conflict freedom directly with
verification conditions and assertion checking. Finally, our
approach performs precise, compositional reasoning about
edits by combining lightweight dependence analysis with
relational reasoning using product programs.
Relational verification. Verification of conflict freedom is
related to a line of work on relational program logics [14, 39,
42] and product programs [12, 13, 44]. For instance, Benton’s
Relational Hoare Logic (RHL) [14] allows proving equiva-
lence between a pair of structurally similar programs. Sousa
and Dillig generalize Benton’s work by developing Carte-
sian Hoare Logic, which is used for proving k-safety of pro-
grams [39]. Barthe et al. propose another technique for rela-
tional verification using product programs [12, 13] and apply
their technique to relational properties, such as equivalence
and 2-safety [40]. In this work, we build on the notion of
product programs used in prior work [12, 13, 44]. However,
rather than constructing a monolithic product of the four
program version, we construct mini-products for each edit.
Furthermore, our proposed product construction algorithm
differs from prior techniques in that it uses similarity metrics
to guide synchronization and generalizes to n-way products.
Cross-version program analysis. There has been renewed
interest in program analysis techniques for answering ques-
tions about program differences across versions [32]. Prior
work on comparing closely related programs versions in-
clude regression verification that checks semantic equiva-
lence using uninterpreted function abstraction of equivalent
callees [19, 22, 30], mutual summaries [23, 41], relational
invariant inference to prove differential properties [31] and
verification modulo versions [34]. Other approaches include
static analysis for abstract differencing [27, 35], symbolic
execution for verifying assertion-equivalence [37] and differ-
ential symbolic execution to summarize differences [36]. Our
work is perhaps closest to differential assertion checking [31]
in the use of product programs and invariant inference. How-
ever, we do not require an assertion and verify a more com-
plex property involving four different programs. We note
that bugs arising from 3-way merges could potentially also
be uncovered using multi-version testing [26].
10 Conclusion and Future Work
We have proposed a notion of semantic conflict freedom for
3-waymerges and described a verification algorithm for prov-
ing this property. Our verification algorithm analyzes the
edited parts of the program in a precise way using product
programs, but leverages lightweight dependence analysis to
reason about program fragments that are shared between all
program versions. Our evaluation shows that the proposed
approach can verify semantic conflict-freedom for many real-
world benchmarks and identify issues in problematic merges
that are generated by textual 3-way merge tools.
We view this work as a first step towards precise, semantics-
aware merge synthesis. In future work, we plan to explore
synthesis techniques that can automatically generate correct-
by-construction 3-way program merges. Since correct merge
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candidates should obey semantic conflict freedom, the verifi-
cation algorithm proposed in this paper is necessarily a key
ingredient of such semantics-aware merge synthesis tools.
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σ ⊢ skip ⇓ σ
σ ⊢ e ⇓ c σ ′ = σ [(x , 0) 7→ c]
σ ⊢ x := e ⇓ σ ′
σ ⊢ e1 ⇓ c1 σ ⊢ e2 ⇓ c2
σ ′ = σ [(x , c1) 7→ c2]
σ ⊢ x[e1] := e2 ⇓ σ ′
σ [(x , 0)] = c
σ ⊢ out(x) ⇓ σ
σ ⊢ S1 ⇓ σ1
σ1 ⊢ S2 ⇓ σ2
σ ⊢ S1; S2 ⇓ σ2
σ ⊢ C ⇓ true
σ ⊢ S1 ⇓ σ1
σ ⊢ C ? {S1} : {S2} ⇓ σ1
σ ⊢ C ⇓ false
σ ⊢ S2 ⇓ σ2
σ ⊢ C ? {S1} : {S2} ⇓ σ2
σ ⊢ C ⇓ false
σ ⊢ while(C) {S} ⇓ σ
σ ⊢ C ⇓ true
σ ⊢ S ⇓ σ1
σ1 ⊢ while(C) {S} ⇓ σ2
σ ⊢ while(C) {S} ⇓ σ2
Figure 11. Operational semantics
Appendix A: Operational Semantics
Figure 11 shows the operational semantics of the language
from Figure 5. Recall that σ maps (variable, index) pairs to
values, and we view scalar variables as arrays with a single
valid index at 0. Since the semantics of expressions is com-
pletely standard, we do not show them here. However, one
important point worth noting is the semantics of expressions
involving array reads:
σ ⊢ e ⇓ c
(a, c) ∈ dom(σ )
σ ⊢ a[e] ⇓ σ [(a, c)]
σ ⊢ e ⇓ c
(a, c) < dom(σ )
σ ⊢ a[e] ⇓ ⊥
In other words, reads from locations that have not been
initialized yield a special constant ⊥.
Appendix B: Soundness of Product
Here, we provide a proof of Theorem 5.4. The proof is by
structural induction over the product construction rules
given in Figure 8. Since the two directions of the proof are
completely symmetric, we only prove one direction. Note
that the base case is trivial because ⊢ S⇝ S.
Rule 1. Suppose σ ⊢ A ⇓ σ ′ and σ ′ ⊢ S1;S2; . . . ;Sn ⇓ σ ′′.
By the premise of the proof rule and the inductive hypothesis,
we have σ ′ ⊢ S ⇓ σ ′′. Thus, σ ⊢ A;S ⇓ σ ′′.
Rule 2. Suppose σ ⊢ (C ? {St } : {Se });S1;S2; . . . ;Sn ⇓
σ ′′. Without loss of generality, suppose σ ⊢ C ⇓ true , and
suppose σ ⊢ St ;S1 ⇓ σ ′, so σ ′ ⊢ S2; . . . ;Sn ⇓ σ ′′. By the
first premise of the proof rule and the inductive hypothesis,
we have σ ⊢ S′ ⇓ σ ′′. Hence, σ ⊢ C ? {S′} : {S′′} ⇓ σ ′′.
Rule 3. Let Sx = while(C1) {SB1 };S1. Suppose we have σ ⊢
Sx ;S2; . . . ;Sn ⇓ σ ′. Suppose there is exists Si that satisfies
first premise of the proof rule. Observe that S1;S2; . . . ;Sn ;
is semantically equivalent to Sn ;S2; . . . ;Sn−1;S1; as long
as S1, Sn , do not share variables between them and also
with S2 . . .Sn−1. Since Sx and Si have no shared variables
between them and with any other program Sj different
than Sx and Si , we have
σ ⊢ Si ;S2; . . . ;Si−1;Si+1; . . .Sn ; while(C1) {SB1 };S1 ⇓ σ ′
Then, by the premise of the proof rule and the inductive
hypothesis, we have σ ⊢ S ⇓ σ ′.
Rule 4. Suppose we have σ ⊢ S1;S2; . . . ;Sn ⇓ σ ′′ where
each Si is of the form while(Ci ) {SBi };S′i . By the same rea-
son as in Rule 3. we can move any loop in each Si to the
beginning as they don’t share any variable with any otherSj .
That is, considering H = S1; . . . ;So be the set of programs
satisfying the second premise we have
σ ⊢ while(C1) {SB1 }; . . .while(Co) {SBo } ⇓ σ ′
and considering So+1; . . .Sn a sequence of the original
programs excluding the ones in H we have
σ ′ ⊢ S′1; . . .S′o ;So+1; . . .Sn ⇓ σ ′′
Then, by the last premises of the proof rule and the induc-
tive hypothesis, we have that σ ⊢ S′;S′′ ⇓ σ ′′.
Rule 5. Suppose we have
σ ⊢ while(C1) {S1}; while(C2) {S2};S3; . . . ;Sn ⇓ σ ′
LetW ′ be the loop while(C1 ∧C2) {S1;S2}. SinceC1,C2 and
S1,S2 have disjoint sets of variables, the program fragment
while(C1) {S1}; while(C2) {S2} is semantically equivalent
toW ′;R (where R comes from the third line of the proof
rule). Hence, we have σ ⊢ W ′;R;S3; . . . ;Sn ⇓ σ ′. By the
first premise of the proof rule and the inductive hypothesis,
if σ0 ⊢ S1;S2 ⇓ σ1 for any σ0,σ1, then σ0 ⊢ S ⇓ σ1. Thus,
σ ⊢ W ′ ⇓ σ ∗ implies σ ⊢ W ⇓ σ ∗, which in turn implies
σ ⊢W ;R;S3; . . . ;Sn ⇓ σ ′. By the last premise of the proof
rule and the inductive hypothesis, we know σ ⊢ S′ : σ ′;
hence, the property holds.
Appendix C: Proof of Soundness of Relational
Post-conditions
The proof is by structural induction on Sˆ.
Case 1. Sˆ = [·], and the edits are S1, . . . ,S4. In this case,
Figure 7 constructs the relational post-condition by first com-
puting the product program S as S1[V1/V ] ⊛ . . . ⊛ S[V4/4]
and then computing the standard post-condition of S. By
Theorem 5.4, we have σ ⊢ S ⇓ σ ′ iff σ ⊢ S1[V1/V ] ⊛ . . . ⊛
S[V4/4] ⇓ σ ′. Furthermore, by the correctness of post op-
erator, we know that {φ}S{φ ′} is a valid Hoare triple. This
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implies {φ}S1[V1/V ]; . . . ;S4[V4/V ]{φ ′} is also a valid Hoare
triple.
Case 2. Sˆ = S (i.e., Sˆ does not contain holes). By the sec-
ond rule in Figure 7, we know that {φ}S1; . . . ;Sn{φ ′} is
a valid Hoare triple. Now, consider any valuation σ sat-
isfying φ. By the correctness of the Hoare triple, if σ ⊢
S1; . . . ;Sn ⇓ σ ′, we know that σ ′ also satisfies φ ′. Now, re-
call thatS1; . . . ;Sn contains uninterpreted functions, andwe
assume that F (®x) can return any value, as long as it returns
something consistent for the same input values. Let Σ repre-
sent the set of all valuations σi such that σ ⊢ S1; . . . ;Sn ⇓ σi .
By the correctness of the Hoare triple, we know that any
σi ∈ Σ satisfies φ ′. Assuming the correctness of the mod
and dependence analysis, for any valuation σ such that
σ ⊢ S[V1/V ]; . . . ;S[V4/V ] ⇓ σ ′, we know that σ ′ ∈ Σ. Since
all valuations in Σ satisfy φ ′, this implies σ ′ also satisfies φ ′.
Thus, {φ}S[V1/V ]; . . . ;S[V4/V ]{φ ′} is also a valid Hoare
triple.
Case 3. Sˆ = Sˆ1; Sˆ2. Let ®∆A denote the prefix of ®∆ that is
used for filling holes in Sˆ1, and ®∆B denote the prefix of ®∆1
that is used for filling holes in Sˆ2. By the premise of the third
rule and inductive hypothesis, we have
{φ}(Sˆ1[∆A1])[V1/V ]); . . . ; (Sˆ1[∆A4])[V4/V ]){φ1}
as well as
{φ1}(Sˆ2[∆B1])[V1/V ]); . . . ; (Sˆ2[∆B4])[V4/V ]){φ2}
Using these and the standard Hoare rule for composition,
we can conclude:
{φ} (Sˆ1[∆A1])[V1/V ]); . . . ; (Sˆ1[∆A4])[V4/V ]);
(Sˆ2[∆B1])[V1/V ]); . . . ; (Sˆ2[∆B4])[V4/V ]) {φ2}
Since we can commute statements over different variables,
this implies:
{φ} (Sˆ1[∆A1]; Sˆ2[∆B1])[V1/V ]); . . . ;
(Sˆ1[∆A4]; Sˆ2[∆B4])[V4/V ]) {φ2}
Next, using the fact that Sˆ[∆i ] = (Sˆ1; Sˆ2)[∆i ] = Sˆ1[∆Ai ]; Sˆ2[∆Bi ],
we can conclude:
{φ}(Sˆ[∆1])[V1/V ]); . . . ; (Sˆ[∆4])[V4/V ]){φ2}
Case 4. Sˆ = C ? {Sˆ1} : {Sˆ2}. Let ®∆A, ®∆B denote the prefixes
of ®∆, ®∆1 that is used for filling holes in Sˆ1 and Sˆ2 respectively.
Also, let Ci denote C[Vi/V ]. By the first premise of rule 4
from Figure 7 and the inductive hypothesis, we have:
{φ ∧C1} (Sˆ1[∆A1])[V1/V ]); . . . ; (Sˆ1[∆A4])[V4/V ]) {φ1}
Now, using the second premise and the inductive hypothesis,
we also have:
{φ ∧ ¬C1} (Sˆ2[∆B1])[V1/V ]); . . . ; (Sˆ2[∆B4])[V4/V ]) {φ2}
Using these two facts and the standard Hoare logic rule for
if statements, we get:
{φ} C1?(Sˆ1[∆A1])[V1/V ]); . . . ; (Sˆ1[∆A4])[V4/V ]) :
(Sˆ2[∆B1])[V1/V ]); . . . ; (Sˆ2[∆B4])[V4/V ]) {φ1}
Now, since φ logically entails
∧
i, j Ci ↔ Cj , the statement
above is equivalent to:
C1 ? {(Sˆ1[∆A1])[V1/V ]} : {(Sˆ2[∆B1])[V1/V ]};
. . .
C4 ? {(Sˆ1[∆A4])[V4/V ]} : {(Sˆ2[∆B4])[V4/V ]};
Next, using the fact that Sˆ[∆i ] = (C ? {Sˆ1} : {Sˆ2})[∆i ] =
C ? {Sˆ1[∆Ai ]} : {Sˆ2[®∆Bi ]}, we can conclude:
{φ} ((C1 ? {Sˆ1} : {Sˆ2})[∆1])[V1/V ]; . . . ;
((C4 ? {Sˆ1} : {Sˆ2}))[∆4])[V4/V ] {φ ′}
Case 5. Sˆ = while(C) {Sˆ}. As in case (4), let Ci denote
C[Vi/V ]. From the premise of rule (5) of Figure 7 and the
inductive hypothesis, we know:
{I} (Sˆ[∆1])[V1/V ]; . . . (Sˆ[∆4])[V4/V ] {I}
Since we also have φ |= I from the premise, this implies:
{φ} while(C1) {(Sˆ[∆1])[V1/V ]; . . . (Sˆ[∆4])[V4/V ]} {I∧¬C1}
Next, since we can commute statements over different vari-
ables and I implies ∧i j C[Vi/V ] ↔ C[Vj/V ], we can con-
clude:
{φ} while(C1) {(Sˆ[∆1])[V1/V ]}; . . . ;
while(C4) {(Sˆ[∆4])[V4/V ]} {I ∧ ¬C1}
Finally, because the loop while(Ci ) {Sˆ[∆i ]} is the same as
(while(Ci ) {Sˆ})[∆i ], we have:
{φ} (while(C1) {Sˆ[V1/V ]})[∆1]; . . . ;
(while(C4) {Sˆ[V4/V ]})[∆4] {I ∧ ¬C1}
Case 6. First, assuming the soundness of the standard post
operator, we have {φ}S{post(S,φ)}. Using the premise of
the proof rule and Theorem 5.4, we obtain:
{φ} (Sˆ[∆11])[V1/V ]; . . . (Sˆ[∆14])[V4/V ] {post(S,φ)}
Since ∆1i is the prefix of ∆i that contains as many holes as
Sˆ, we also know Sˆ[∆1i ] = Sˆ[∆i ]. Thus, we get:
{φ} (Sˆ[∆1])[V1/V ]; . . . (Sˆ[∆4])[V4/V ] {post(S,φ)}
Appendix D: Soundness of n-way Diff Algorithm
Theorem 6.1 follows directly from the following two lemmas:
Lemma 10.1. If |∆| = numHoles(∆ˆ), then Compose ensures
the following post-conditions:
• |∆′ | = |∆ˆ|
• For any Sˆ s.t. numHoles(Sˆ) = |∆ˆ|, (Sˆ[∆ˆ])[∆] = Sˆ[∆′]
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Proof. Consider the two postconditions of Compose. For the
branch ∆ˆ = [ ], it is easy to see that ∆′ = ∆ˆ = [ ] and thus
|∆′ | = |∆ˆ|. For any Sˆ with 0 holes, applying any edits gets
back Sˆ, satisfying the second postcondition.
For the branch head(∆ˆ) = [·], we know numHoles(tail(∆ˆ)) =
numHoles(∆ˆ) − 1 = |tail(∆)| (given the precondition), which
satisfies the precondition of Compose at line 14. The first
postcondition of the recursive call to Compose implies that
size of the return value (|∆′ |) equals |head(∆)| + |tail(∆ˆ)| =
1+ |∆ˆ|−1 = |∆ˆ|. Now consider a Sˆ such that numHoles(Sˆ) =
|∆ˆ|. Let ∆′′ be the return from the recursive call to Compose.
Then Sˆ[∆′] = Sˆ[head(∆) :: ∆′′] = (Sˆ[head(∆)])[∆′′] (by
definition of applying an edit). Since numHoles(Sˆ[head(∆)]) =
numHoles(Sˆ)−1 = |tail(∆ˆ)|, we know that (Sˆ[head(∆)])[∆′′] =
((Sˆ[head(∆)])[tail(∆ˆ)])[tail(∆)] (from the second postcondi-
tion of the recursive call). Since head(∆ˆ) = [·] in this branch,
(Sˆ[head(∆)])[tail(∆ˆ)] = (Sˆ[[·] :: tail(∆ˆ)])[head(∆)] = (Sˆ[∆ˆ])[head(∆)].
This follows from the fact that applying head(∆) to the first
hole in Sˆ followed by applying tail(∆ˆ) is identical to applying
a hole in the first hole in Sˆ followed by applying tail(∆ˆ), fol-
lowed by applying head(∆) which applies it to the first hole
in Sˆ. Further, ((Sˆ[∆ˆ])[head(∆)])[tail(∆)] = (Sˆ[∆ˆ])[∆] by the
rule of applying edits, which proves this postcondition.
For the branch head(∆ˆ) , [·], we know numHoles(tail(∆ˆ)) =
numHoles(∆ˆ). This along with the precondition of Compose
establishes the preconditon to the call to Compose at line 15.
Let ∆′′ denote the return of the recursive call to Compose.
The recursive call ensures that |∆′′ | = |tail(∆ˆ)| = |∆ˆ| − 1.
Thus |∆′ | = |head(∆ˆ) :: ∆′′ | = |∆ˆ|, which establishes the first
postcondition. Now consider a Sˆ such that numHoles(Sˆ) =
|∆ˆ|. Then Sˆ[∆′] = Sˆ[head(∆ˆ) :: ∆′′] = (Sˆ[head(∆ˆ)])[∆′′].
Since numHoles(Sˆ[head(∆ˆ)]) = numHoles(Sˆ)−1 = |tail(∆ˆ)|,
we know that (Sˆ[head(∆ˆ)])[∆′′] = ((Sˆ[head(∆ˆ])[tail(∆ˆ)])[∆]
(from the second postcondition of the recursive call), which
simplifies to (Sˆ[head(∆ˆ) :: tail(∆ˆ)])[∆] = (Sˆ[∆ˆ)])[∆] by the
property of applying an edit. □
Lemma 10.2. If |∆i | = numHoles(Sˆ) for all i ∈ [1, . . . ,k]
and 2Diff satisfies the contract provided in Algorithm 3, then
GenEdit ensures the following post-conditions:
• |∆′i | = numHoles(Sˆ′) for i ∈ [1, . . . ,k + 1]
• Sˆ′[∆′k+1] = S and Sˆ′[∆′i ] = Sˆ[∆i ] for i ∈ [1, . . . ,k]
Proof. First, the precondition |∆i | = numHoles(∆ˆ) ofCompose
in line 9 is satisfied from the precondition |∆i | = numHoles(Sˆ)
of GenEdit and the second postcondition numHoles(∆ˆ) =
numHoles(Sˆ) of Diff2.
Now, consider the postcondition |∆′i | = numHoles(Sˆ′)
for i ∈ [1, . . . ,k + 1]. From the first postcondition of Diff2
at line 7, we know that numHoles(Sˆ′) = |∆ˆ|. For any i ∈
[1, . . . ,k], the first postcondition of Compose at line 9 im-
plies |∆ˆ| = |∆′i |. Together, they imply that numHoles(Sˆ′) =
|∆′i |.
The postcondition Sˆ′[∆′k+1] = Sˆ follows directly from the
third postcondition of Diff2 at line 7 and line ??. Now con-
sider ∆′i for i ∈ [1, . . . ,k]. We know from the postcondition
of Diff2 that numHoles(Sˆ′) = |∆ˆ|. Therefore, from the post-
condition of Compose at line ?? (where we substitute Sˆ′ for
the bound variable Sˆ), we know that (Sˆ′[∆ˆ])[∆i ] = Sˆ′[∆′i ].
From the postconditon ofDiff2 at line 7, we know Sˆ′[∆ˆ] = Sˆ.
Together, they imply Sˆ[∆i ] = Sˆ′[∆′i ]. □
Appendix E: Example of 4-way diff
We illustrate the 4-way diff using a simple example:
O  c ? {x := 1} : {y := 2}; z := 3
A  c ? {x := 2} : {y := 2};
B  c ? {x := 1} : {y := 3}; z := 3
M  c ? {x := 2} : {y := 3};
According to Algorithm 2, we start out with the shared pro-
gram Sˆ = O and ∆O = [ ].
Now consider the first call to GenEdit(Sˆ,A,∆O). After
invoking Diff2(A, Sˆ) at line 7, it returns the tuple (Sˆ′,∆, ∆ˆ)
where Sˆ′  c ? {[·]} : {y := 2}; [·], ∆  [x := 2, skip] and
∆ˆ  [x := 1, z := 3]. The reader can verify that Sˆ′[∆] = A
and Sˆ′[∆ˆ] = Sˆ = O . Next, consider the call toCompose(∆ˆ,∆1)
where ∆1 = [ ]. The call executes the branch in line ?? twice
(since ∆ˆ does not contain any holes) and returns ∆′ as ∆ˆ.
Therefore, the call to GenEdit returns the tuple (Sˆ′, [x :=
1, z := 3], [x := 2, skip]), which constitutes Sˆ,∆O ,∆A for
the next call to GenEdit.
The next call toGenEdit(Sˆ,B,∆O ,∆A) callsDiff2(B, c ? {[·]} :
{y := 2}; [·]) and returns (Sˆ′,∆, ∆ˆ), where Sˆ′  c ? {[·]} :
{[·]}; [·] and ∆  [x := 1,y := 2, z := 3] (which becomes ∆B)
and ∆ˆ  [[·],y := 2, [·]]. The reader can verify that Sˆ′[∆] = B
and Sˆ′[∆ˆ] = Sˆ. The loop at line 8 updates ∆O and ∆A —
we only describe the latter. The return of Compose(∆ˆ,∆A)
updates ∆A to [x := 2,y := 2, skip] by walking the first ar-
gument and replacing [·] with corresponding entry from
∆A . Similarly, the ∆O is updated by Compose(∆ˆ,∆O) to
[x := 1,y := 2, z := 3].
The final call to GenEdit(Sˆ,M,∆O ,∆A ,∆B) returns the
tuple (Sˆ,∆O ,∆A ,∆B ,∆M), where Sˆ,∆O ,∆A ,∆B remain
unchanged (since Sˆ already contains holes at all the changed
locations), and ∆M is assigned [x := 2,y := 3, skip]. The
reader can verify that Sˆ[∆O] = O, Sˆ[∆A] = A, Sˆ[∆B] =
B, Sˆ[∆M] = M .
Appendix F: An abstract implementation of Diff2
Algorithm 3 describes Diff2 algorithm for computing the
2-way diff. It takes as input a program S and a program
with holes Sˆ and returns the shared program with holes
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Algorithm 3 Algorithm for 2-way AST Diff
1: procedure Diff2(S, Sˆ)
2: Input: A program S and a shared program Sˆ
3: Output: Shared program Sˆ′ and edits ∆, ∆ˆ
4: Ensures: |∆| = |∆ˆ| = numHoles(Sˆ′)
5: Ensures: numHoles(∆ˆ) = numHoles(Sˆ)
6: Ensures: Sˆ′[∆] = S, Sˆ′[∆ˆ] = Sˆ
7: if Sˆ = [·] then return ([·], [S], [Sˆ])
8: else if Sˆ = S then return (S, [ ], [ ])
9: else if * then return Diff2(S; skip, Sˆ) ▷
Non-deterministic skip introduction
10: else if * then return Diff2(skip;S, Sˆ) ▷
Non-deterministic skip introduction
11: else if * then return Diff2(S, Sˆ; skip) ▷
Non-deterministic skip introduction
12: else if * then return Diff2(S, skip; Sˆ) ▷
Non-deterministic skip introduction
13: else if S = S1;S2 and Sˆ = Sˆ1; Sˆ2 then
14: (Sˆ′1,∆1, ∆ˆ1) := Diff2(S1, Sˆ1)
15: (Sˆ′2,∆2, ∆ˆ2) := Diff2(S2, Sˆ2)
16: return (Sˆ′1; Sˆ′2,∆1 :: ∆2, ∆ˆ1 :: ∆ˆ2)
17: else if S = C ? {S1} : {S2} and Sˆ = C ′ ? {Sˆ1} :
{Sˆ2} and C = C ′ then
18: (Sˆ′1,∆1, ∆ˆ1) := Diff2(S1, Sˆ1)
19: (Sˆ′2,∆2, ∆ˆ2) := Diff2(S2, Sˆ2)
20: return (C ? {Sˆ′1} : {Sˆ′2},∆1 :: ∆2, ∆ˆ1 :: ∆ˆ2)
21: else if S = while(C) {S1} and Sˆ = while(C ′) {Sˆ1}
and C = C ′ then
22: (Sˆ′1,∆1, ∆ˆ1) := Diff2(S1, Sˆ1)
23: return (while(C) {Sˆ′1},∆1, ∆ˆ1)
24: else
25: return ([·], [S], [Sˆ])
Sˆ′ and edits ∆ and ∆ˆ, such that Sˆ′[∆] = S and Sˆ′[∆ˆ] = Sˆ.
Since Sˆ may contain holes, the edit ∆ˆ may contain holes.
The algorithm recursively descends down the structure of
the two programs and tries to identify the common program
and generate respective edits for the differences. We use non-
deterministic conditional to abstract from actual heuristics
to match parts of the two ASTs. For example, when matching
S with Sˆ1; Sˆ2, a heuristic may decide to match S with Sˆ1
and create a shared program [·]; [·] and edits ∆ = [S, skip],
∆ˆ = [Sˆ1, Sˆ2]; it may also choose to match S with Sˆ2 and cre-
ate a shared program [·]; [·] and edits ∆ = [skip,S], [Sˆ1, Sˆ2].
The decision is often based on algorithms based on vari-
ants of longest-common-subsequence [24]. However, these
decisions only help maximize the size of the shared pro-
gram, and do not affect the soundness of the edit generation.
Lines 9 to 12 allow us to model all such heuristics by non-
deterministically inserting skip statemnets before or after
a statement. Line 24 ensures that the diff procedure can al-
ways return by constructing the trivial shared program [·]
and S and Sˆ as the respective edits. Line 7 checks if Sˆ is
a hole, then the shared program is a hole [·] and the two
edits contain S and Sˆ respectively. Line 8 is the case when
S equals Sˆ. We use = to denote the syntactic equality of
the two syntax trees. The remaining rules are standard and
recurse down the AST structure and match the subtrees.
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